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“Why does your name even appear on the paper?” 
“I am the one who suggested the problem […] I prepared the grant 
application to the NIH. […] Without such support [my student] could do 
nothing. I’m not just talking about the fellowship. I’m talking about all the 
instruments in my lab, the chemicals, the glassware. […] I see [her] almost 
every day; we discuss the progress of the work; I suggest certain techniques; 
I call important references to her attention […] there’s both a teacher-
apprentice relationship and collegiality.”  
(Djerassi C., Cantor’s Dilemma, Penguin Books, 1989; pp.50-51). 
 
“I think there’s rarely more than one inventor. I mean, if you wake up and 
you have an idea, that’s the invention. And then there’s all this work 
around it, of course … [The postdoctoral researchers] contributed to the 
work, but they didn’t do any really innovative work […] They don’t have 
time to think as much, they have a lot of manual labor to do” 
(McSherry C., Who Owns Academic Work?, Harvard Univ. Press; 2003; p.84) 
 
1. Introduction 
Attribution rights play a key role in the economics of science. Academic scientists build up their 
reputation through their publications, so that authorship credits play an important role in career 
advancement, access to funding, or admission to learned societies. At a systemic level, the authorship-
based incentive system pushes scientists to diffuse openly the results of their research, and the related 
data and methodologies (Merton, 1957; Dasgupta and David, 1994; Stephan, 1996; Audretsch et al., 
2004).   
Increasingly, academic scientists also earn scientific credit through patenting: being listed among the 
inventors of a well-known patent (inventorship) may bring not only economic returns in the form of 
licensing fees, but also reputational gains. Such a reputation is particularly valuable outside the 
academic community, where patents are often seen as a “proof of impact” of research conducted with 
public money (see, for example, the guidelines of governmental research evaluation exercises, such as 
RAE, 2008, and CIVR, 2006; see also OECD, 2003)  Recent studies show that “academic inventors” are 
most often very prolific authors, whose publishing activity appears to be positively affected by their 
engagement in patenting (Azoulay et al., 2007; Breschi et al., 2007). 
Both authorship and inventorship are forms of intellectual property (legal or ‘moral’ rights of 
attribution), which national legislations discipline according to international conventions.1 At the same 
time, and especially within the scientific community, they appear to be largely administered on the basis 
of social norms (Zuckerman, 1968; Fasse, 1992). 
                                                 
1 The two international treaties that matter most in this respect are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the Berne Convention. The former is a UN-administered agreement which entered into force in 
1976, and it contributes to the International Bill of Rights; its article 11 protects 'the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which [a person] is the author' (UNESCO, 2001). The latter is an 
international treaty for the harmonization of national copyright laws, dating back to 1886 and now administered by WIPO, the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2008); authors’ moral rights are protected by article 6. The interpretation of 
moral rights, as defined by the Berne Convention, is generally much more extensive in continental Europe (esp. France) than in 
the UK and the USA (Fernandenz-Molina and Pais, 2001; Fisk, 2006). 
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Well-established studies of scientific authorship suggest that attribution norms allow for 
negotiations within the research teams, which may result in mis-attributions and omissions (Biagioli et 
al., 1999). Over the years, widespread concern has also been expressed about the practices of honorary or 
guest authorship in medical and physics journals (e.g. Mowatt et al., 2002; Ioannidis, 2008). More recent 
legal case studies suggest that the same may happen with academic inventorship (McSherry, 2003; 
Seymore, 2006). Since many academic inventions are both patented and described in one or more 
scientific publications, contrasts may also arise on the criteria to be applied for distributing authorship 
and inventorship over the same research product (Ducor, 2000; Murray, 2002; Murray and Stern, 2007; 
Gans et al., 2008).  
In this paper, we assess the relative weight of legal and social norms adopted by academic scientists 
for the joint attribution of inventorship and authorship over “patented research results”. We use an 
original sample of 681 “patent-publication pairs” (PPPs) produced by 308 Italian academic inventors 
between 1975 and 2002, in the fields of Chemical Engineering, Electronic Engineering and 
Telecommunications, Pharmacology, and Biology, along with related bibliometric and biographical 
information on the selected academic inventors and their co-authors. 
We find that inventorship attribution follows stricter criteria than authorship attribution. As a 
result, several authors of scientific publications may be excluded from the list of inventors of the related 
patents (especially in Biology and Pharmacology). However, such exclusion cannot be entirely explained 
by the individual scientists’ contribution to the research project, as legal norms on inventorship would 
suggest. Social norms, and in particular seniority, also matter, so that junior co-authors are more at risk 
of being excluded from inventorship, other things being equal. At the same time, our results are 
suggestive of the existence of widespread practices of guest and gift authorship attribution. We conclude 
that existing practices of authorship and inventorship attribution may need to be critically re-examined. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concepts of co-inventorship and co-
authorship, and develop the hypotheses to test. We do so by assessing the legal and sociological 
literature on attribution rights, publication guidelines of various scientific journals, and technology 
transfer office recommendations to potential academic inventors. In section 3 we describe our 
methodology for the identification of PPPs, and the resulting data sample. In section 4, we provide 
descriptive statistics on inventorship and authorship attribution at the PPP level. In section 5 we 
estimate the probability for the co-author of a publication to be absent from a related patent, as a 




2. Guest authors and ghost inventors: problems of attribution in large research teams  
Multiple-authored publications are a common feature of many scientific and technical fields, and 
the average number of authors per publication keeps increasing (Weeks et al., 2004). Drenth (1998) 
estimates that in the biomedical field the mean number of authors per paper has increased steadily from 
3.21 in 1975 to 4.46 in 1995;2 similarly, Levsky et al. (2007) calculate a 23 per cent increase in the 
number of authors from 1995 to 2005. Historians and sociologists of science have explained this trend 
with the changing nature of the scientific work, which is increasingly based on specialization, inter-
disciplinarity, and the sharing of data and facilities (Katz and Martin, 1997). Some have also suggested 
that the growing “publish-or-perish” pressure on faculty may induce scientists to trade authorship 
credits in order to keep up their publication record, thus inflating the number of authors per paper 
(Levsky et al., 2007). 
The number of multi-invented patents has also increased significantly over the last three 
decades, as revealed by European and US Patent Office data.3 However, comparisons with publication 
data reveal that the average number of inventors per patent is well below the average number of authors 
per publication, even for comparable technological and scientific fields (Meyer and Bhattacharya, 2004). 
One common explanation for this difference is that patents originate mostly from industrial research, 
funded by business companies and carried out by their employees. The proprietary nature of such 
research limits the inventors’ freedom to choose their research team partners, contrary to what happens 
to academic scientists. 
However, differences in the number of co-authors and co-inventors can also be found when 
comparing patent-publication pairs, that is patents and publications which originate from the same 
research team and programme (Ducor, 2000; Murray, 2002). In this case, the only possible explanation 
for the difference is that the qualifying criteria for being considered either an author or an inventor 
differ, or that some differences exist in the established practices of attribution.  
 
2.1 Honours, Gifts, and Guests: the Vexed Issue of Co-authorship 
Authorship attribution considerably affects the productivity evaluation of researchers and their 
institutions, as well as individual careers, funding decisions, and public perceptions about science. 
Accordingly, concerns with the diffusion of co-authorship are of two related kinds. First, “the rapid 
increase of multi-authored papers [has introduced] ambiguity about the respective contributions of the 
                                                 
2 In particular, Drenth (1998) observes a rise of authorship rate among professors and chair-persons. 
3 The average number of inventors per patent application at the EPO (European Patent Office) has increased constantly, from 
1.95 in 1980 to 2.46 in 1999. When considering only patents in science-based fields such as organic chemistry, the figures are 
respectively 2.76 and 3.88. (as suggested by our own elaborations on the EP-CESPRI database). 
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joint authors” (Zuckerman, 1968: 277). Second, fears have been expressed over mis-attribution practices, 
such as ‘guest’ (or ‘honorary’) and ‘gift’ authorship, which occur when a scientist is listed in the authors’ 
by-line of a paper to which he/she has not contributed (Drenth, 1998; Mowatt et al., 2002).4  The 
resulting ambiguity about individual contributions makes publications less useful as a signal of scientific 
credit and threatens the ethical integrity and credibility of the entire research, from the soundness of the 
applied methods to the quality of data (Biagioli, 1998).  
These problems are particularly severe for biomedical research, because of the great importance 
of responsibility attribution in that field. As a consequence, since 1985, the International Committee of 
Medical Journal Editors has continued to publish the ‘Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted 
to Biomedical Journals’. In their latest version, the Requirements recommend the following criteria for 
authorship:  
“Authorship credit should be based on 1) substantial contributions to conception and 
design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data; 2) drafting the 
article or revising it critically for important intellectual content; and 3) final approval of 
the version to be published […] Acquisition of funding, collection of data, or general 
supervision of the research group, alone, do not justify authorship” (ICMJE, 2007).5  
According to the ICMJE Requirements, a heterogeneous set of authors can be listed together in 
the same by-line. For example, a scientist who has limited himself to an entrepreneurial role (such as 
chasing grants, “conceiving and designing” the paper, and revising it “critically”) could be listed along 
with a colleague who has carried out most of the work (such as acquiring, analysing and interpreting the 
data, drafting the manuscript, and providing the technical expertise).6 Despite such latitude, the ICMJE 
Requirements have been largely ignored by the scientific community. For example, Bates et al. (2004) 
find that 60 per cent of 72 articles surveyed in 2002 in the Annals of Internal Medicine and 21 per cent of 
107 articles in the British Medical Journal have at least one author that does not meet the first ICJME 
criterion. Similar results have been found by Hwang et al. (2003) for the Journal of Radiology (see also 
references therein on studies in the Lancet and the Dutch Medical Journal).  
Authorship attribution remains a highly subjective decision, which is negotiated within research 
teams, according to customary rules that differ across disciplines and laboratories, and do not necessarily 
match journal guidelines. In addition, a lack of respect of authorship criteria can be hardly detected or 
                                                 
4 Even worse is the case of ‘ghost’ authors, typically junior scientists that contribute significantly to the published research, but 
who are mentioned only in the acknowledgements section of the paper or not mentioned at all (Rennie and Flanagin, 1994). 
Quantitative accounts of guest and honorary authorship are also provided by Hoen et al. (1998) and Mowatt et al. (2002), and 
references therein. 
5  See also the Faculty Policies on Integrity in Science of the Harvard Faculty of Medicine 
http://www.hms.harvard.edu/integrity/index.html. Similar rules, albeit less detailed, can be found in the authors’ guidelines of 
the International Electrical and Electronic Engineering association (IEEE, 2008; Section 8.2.1.A). 
6 The economic logic behind rewarding through authorship a scientific entrepreneur, such as a laboratory head, is well stated in 
Carl Djerassi’s (1989) fictitious portrait of a senior scientist explaining why she deserves co-authorship along with her junior 
partner, as quoted at the beginning of the paper. On Djerassi’s authority as a source of information on authorship practices, see 
Garfield (1983).  
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sanctioned by the journal editors: when guest or gift authors are added to a publication, there is little 
risk of undermining the scientific validity of the article and the reputation that the “true” authors may 
derive from it.7 
Name-order in the authors’ by-line is often used to identify the individual contributions. 
Although general authorship guidelines (those of the ICMEJ among others) do not provide mandatory 
recommendations, two major traditions exist: alphabetical ordering, which is typical, for example, of 
social sciences, and contribution-related ordering, which is most common in the hard sciences and is 
explicitly recommended by some scientific societies.8  
In their study on medical publications, Mowatt et al. (2002) calculate that 76 per cent of by-lines 
assign the first position to the person who contributed most significantly to the study, while only 2 per 
cent list authors alphabetically. Of the remaining 22 per cent, seniority criteria were involved, such as 
listing the senior author last. Zuckerman’s (1968) seminal work on Nobel laureate authorship practices 
revealed early on that name ordering decisions are most often delegated to senior investigators, who base 
their judgement both on contribution and seniority.9 
Summing up, the message conveyed by the first and last positions in a non-alphabetical by-line 
is relatively unambiguous: the first author is usually the junior scientist who has contributed most to the 
paper; the last is the senior investigator, who runs the lab, chases the grants, and sets the research 
strategy. The same cannot be said for the authors in between. These may be either effective contributors 
to the paper (although less important and/or more senior ones than the first author), but they may also 
be guest authors of many sorts (such as laboratory technicians rewarded for their dedication, or very 
senior scientists listed as a sign of deference). In fact, name ordering sustains the notion of authorship 
only partially, provides a mild correction to the mis-attribution problem, and no correction at all to the 
problem of responsibility. 
 
                                                 
7 In some cases the lack of application of the ICMJE requirements is due both to ignorance on the scientists’ part (Bhopal et al., 
1997) and to lack of enforcement by the journal editors. In other cases there are intentional strategies: for example, a few 
pharmaceutical companies have even managed to publish papers produced by internal ghost-writers, but “authored” and 
submitted by complacent guest authors from the academic ranks (Ross et al., 2008, and references therein). 
8 Some professional societies, the ICMJE among them, explicitly recommend to list authors according to their contribution. For 
a review, see Rennie and Flanagin (1994) and Drenth (1998). 
9 In particular, the Nobel laureates interviewed by Zuckerman (who come from all disciplines) point out that a precise 
measurement of relative contributions is impossible, so that a pure contribution-based ordering effort would create conflicts 
within the research teams: ambiguity is necessary to temper tensions within the team. A major obstacle that stands in the way 
of contribution measurement is individuals’ tendency to overestimate their own contribution within a team (Hoen et al., 1998). 
Such a tendency is discussed in economic terms by Van den Steen (2004). Applied sociological analysis of teams provides more 
general evidence of individuals’ overestimation of their own importance (centrality) in teams (Johnson and Orback, 2002). 
Notice also that Zuckerman (1968) points out that Nobel laureates justify placing their own names last in the by-line with a 
noblesse oblige argument (the stated wish to help younger colleagues’ contributions to stand out) but also admit to derogating 
this when the paper has the potential to attract a good deal of attention from the scientific community. 
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2.2 The “Muddy Metaphysics” of Co-Inventorship 
Unlike scientific authorship, inventorship is a legal concept which bears direct economic 
consequences. In the USA, a patent may be declared invalid if the designated inventors’ contribution 
does not match the legally defined one.10 In addition, the inventors’ names can be changed after a patent 
is granted only if the error is made without deceptive intent. This norm also applies to foreign patents, 
when extended to the USA. 
According to section 35 of the US constitution (as amended in 1984), two individuals can be 
designated as inventors on the same patent only if they have worked “jointly” and provided some kind 
of “inventive” contribution (Fasse, 1992, pp. 172-173). In particular, each person named on a patent 
must have contributed to the conception step in the invention (as defined by the claims). Conception is 
“the formation, in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and 
operative invention, as it is to be applied in practice” (Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.).11 
In Europe, even with patents issued by the European Patent Office (EPO), inventorship is 
ultimately defined by the various national legislations. For example, in the United Kingdom the 
inventor is defined as the "actual deviser of the invention...", who in turn is the person(s) who 
contribute(s) to the novelty (inventive step) of the claims listed in the patent application (s7-3 Patents 
Act, 1977). In Italy, as in many other countries, no specific definition of inventor is provided by legal 
texts. As a matter of fact, the legal doctrine on the identification of authors and inventors coincides, 
with the latter being simply defined as the “author of an invention”. Mis-attribution of inventorship 
does not appear to threaten the validity of the patent, but it may cause re-allocation of the property 
rights. 
Criteria for defining inventorship are more restrictive than those defining authorship.12 Being 
involved in the conception of the invention is a requirement that some authors of scientific publications 
may fail. For example, current interpretations of the US law suggest that “merely suggesting a desired 
result” or “having entrepreneurial involvement” do not qualify as inventorship.13 As a result, a scientist 
who raises funds, conceives the initial experiment, and revises the draft paper would qualify as the 
author of a project-related paper (according to the ICMJE guidelines we described above), but not as the 
inventor of any project-related patent. At the opposite end, “following the complete instructions” of a 
colleague or superior does not qualify anybody as an inventor; and even joining a research team too late, 
after its members have conceived the key characteristics of the desired invention, may be a cause for 
exclusion from inventorship. The latter cases bring to mind situations in which a junior scientist or a 
                                                 
10 See for example Yeda Res. & Dev. v. ImClone Systems Inc. in 2006 
11 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
12 The legal opinions provided by university TTOs and IPR consultants are particularly illustrative in this respect. For a 
representative subset of such opinions see: Bennett and Biswas (1997), Hutchins (2003) and Vinarov (2003). 
13 Fasse, 1992; pp. 192ff. 
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graduate student may be rewarded with authorship for her brilliant assistantship, but not with 
inventorship.14  However, both the concept of inventorship and its application are controversial. In 
particular, the US literature suggests that no clear criteria exist to decide which scientists do not qualify 
as inventors of a research-related patent, at least on the sheer basis of their contribution to authorship 
(Fasse, 1992).  
It is also likely that decisions on inventorship attribution, very much like those on authorship, 
depend upon the discretionary judgement of the most senior scientists in the team, who often manage 
the economic details of the research and exercise authority (case-study evidence on this point is provided 
by Colyvas, 2007). These scientists may be more generous towards authorship attribution, which entails 
only a reputational reward, than towards inventorship, which could lead to tangible economic benefits 
and legal hiccups.15  
The practicalities of inventorship attribution also leave room for mistakes and abuses. Very 
much like journal editors, patent office examiners leave the identification of inventors entirely to the 
applicants. At most, signed declarations are required. If not challenged in court, these initial attributions 
remain unscrutinized because patent offices pay attention only to the technical contents of the patents 
they are called to judge.16  
 
2.3 Proposed analysis 
Our discussion of the literature suggests that when a team of scientists achieves a research result 
which has the potential to be both patented and published, the number of authors of the publication(s) 
will be higher than the number of inventors listed on the related patent(s). In addition, we suggest the 
that the exclusion of some authors from inventorship will be based upon both legal and social norms.17  
In particular, we point out three different types of authorship that may not turn into inventorship: 
                                                 
14 For a case of a student’s exclusion from a patent, see Fasse (1992; p. 282). More cases of disputes within academic teams are 
mentioned by Seymore (2006). 
15 In doing so, senior authors may also be affected by a tendency to overvalue their own contribution to patents, a tendency 
which a questionnaire survey by Jaffe et al. (2000) has shown to be quite common. This tendency applies also to authorship, as 
already discussed in footnote 9. It is also well illustrated by interviews to several academic inventors, such as the one conducted 
by MacSherry (2003) and quoted at the beginning of the paper. 
16 Editors will check, through the referees, the relevance, originality and rigour of the paper. Examiners will check for novelty, 
non obviousness, and industrial applicability. It is also doubtful that a junior scientist, excluded from a patent (but possibly 
rewarded with authorship), will find it convenient to sue a senior colleague, upon whom her career prospects may depend 
heavily. Similarly, we can hardly expect the same junior scientist, who has signed both a paper and a patent, to initiate a legal 
action against the inclusion of an illegitimate inventor in the patent. 
17 Although it may also be possible that some patent inventors are excluded from authorship in the related publications, we do 
not deal with this case, for two reasons. First, as discussed above, this case is not as frequent as the opposite one. Second, the 
available data do not allow us to enquire in this direction. The main constraint is the absence of information on co-inventors’ 
relative contribution to the patent, due to the lack of informative value of name ordering in the inventors’ list. As discussed 
above, while many papers list authors according to their contribution and/or seniority, the same does not apply to patents, 
which usually list inventors in alphabetical order. 
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I. Authorship without sufficient inventive contribution. This category includes all scientists and 
laboratory technicians whose contribution has been creative enough to qualify them for 
authorship (according to journal guidelines), but not for inventorship (according to the rule of 
law). It also encompasses senior scientists whose contribution to the research project has been 
largely entrepreneurial. 
II. “Guest” and “gift” authorship. This category includes laboratory technicians and other assistant 
figures (including graduate students and junior scientists in charge of minor tasks), who have 
been rewarded for their dedication or resourcefulness (gift authors) or senior scientists honoured 
for their seniority or prestige (guests). More generally, we include in this category all scientists 
who contribute marginally to a publication and should not be included according to the standard 
guidelines. According to legal norms on patents, none of these authors qualify as inventors. 
III. Authorship subject to arbitrary exclusion. This category includes junior scientists who qualify both 
for authorship and inventorship, but who are arbitrarily excluded from the latter as a 
consequence of a team’s decision. Although quantitative evidence on this occurrence is not 
available, a number of borderline cases are mentioned by McSherry (2003) and Seymore (2006). 
In what follows, we try to assess the relative importance of these types of exclusion, by exploiting 
the information provided by the by-line of scientific publications (when the order of authors is non-
alphabetical). In particular, we assume that first authors in the by-line contribute creatively and 
conceptually to the research effort, whereas last authors provide an “entrepreneurial contribution”, 
possibly (but not necessarily) coupled with a creative or conceptual one. We also assume that the 
contribution of “middle” authors is less significant than that of other authors. Last and middle authors 
may include cases of “guest” and “gift” authorship.  
The key social norm we consider in our analysis is the scientists’ consideration for seniority. We 
assume that seniority affects negatively the probability of exclusion from a patent (controlling for 
contribution), because senior scientists’ hierarchical position allows them to exercise some control over 
all attribution matters (authorship and inventorship). 
On the basis of these assumptions, we can put forward two statements that lend themselves to 
empirical analysis. 
1. The exclusion of first authors cannot be grounded on legal rules, and may be the result of the 
application of social norms; that is, it produces exclusions of type III.  This intuition is 
strengthened if the probability of first authors to be excluded decreases with their seniority: 
younger scholars are more at risk of arbitrary exclusion. 
2. The exclusion of last and middle authors is explained by lack of creative contribution, that is, 
on legal grounds. This is compatible with both type I and type II exclusion. Even in this case, 
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however, finding that senior scientists are less at risk of exclusion would confirm the 
importance of social norms. 
Seniority is correlated to professional experience, as measured by an author’s publication stock. We 
expect scientists with more experience to give a more substantial (creative, conceptual) contribution to 
the research project. In our analysis, therefore, we control for each author’s cumulative number of 
publications at the time of the patent.  
 
3. Data and Methodology. 
 Our database results from the integration of two different sources: the KEINS database on 
Italian academic inventors, and the ISI Science Citation Index, from which we collected the publication 
records of both the academic inventors and their co-authors. In section 3.1 we describe the data and in 
section 3.2 we explain the text-mining methods used to select the patent-publication pairs in four 
different disciplinary fields. 
3.1 Description of the Sample  
The KEINS database contains information on all academic scientists designated as inventors on 
EPO patent applications filed either by universities, public research organizations or business 
companies, for a number of European countries (Lissoni et al., 2006, 2008). It also contains information 
on individual characteristics of the scientists (such as age, affiliation, academic rank, discipline) and the 
information that can be found on the front page of their patents (including title and abstract). In this 
paper, we focus on Italian academic inventors who were already active in 2000, in the four disciplinary 
fields with the highest share of academic inventors over the total number of professors in the field, 
namely: Chemical Engineering (which includes technology of materials, such as macromolecular 
compounds), Biology, Pharmacology, and Electronic Engineering & Telecommunications, for a total of 
308 academic inventors and 552 patents.18 
For these academic inventors we collected publication data from the 1975-2003 on-line version of 
the ISI Science Citation Index.19 Further data from the same source were collected for all their co-
authors, in order to establish the latter’s first year of activity (first year in which a publication in their 
names appears in the Science Citation Index) and number of publications year by year (see Appendix 1).  
 
                                                 
18 Italian scientists listed in the KEINS database include professors from all ranks (assistant, associate and full). The database 
does not include PhD students or post-docs and other non-tenured positions 
19 A more detailed description of this initial sample can be found in Breschi et al. (2007, 2008).  
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3.2 Patent-publication pairs: methodology 
Our methodology is based on the identification of patent-publication pairs (PPPs). A patent and a 
paper form a pair when the same idea is described to some extent in both documents, and at least one 
author and one inventor are the same person. This occurs when a new scientific idea coincides with a 
solution to a technical problem and has some degree of industrial applicability.20 Scientific papers and 
patents differ widely in content, since scientific publications describe a set of theories and/or 
experimental results. Publications are aimed at emphasizing the originality and neatness of the results, 
whereas patents describe the features of a new product or process, of which they emphasize the novelty 
and utility, by laying out a list of claims. However, in so-called “science-based” technologies (‘Pasteur’s 
Quadrant’, described by Stokes, 1997) and in engineering, it is often the case that a patentable 
advancement is also worth publishing in refereed journals. In this case, we may expect highly specific 
words to be present both in the patent and in the publication; inventors and their lawyers may also cut-
and-paste a few sentences from one document into the other. 
To our knowledge, only Ducor (2000), Murray (2002) and Murray and Stern (2007) have tried to 
build PPP databases, although with different methodologies. Ducor (2000) performed a manual search 
of various databases for proteins with specific genetic or aminoacid sequences, finding 40 pairs. Murray’s 
(2002) study concerned a single patent-paper pair on tissue engineering in cartilage. Murray and Stern 
(2007) compared 340 articles published in Nature Biotechnology between 1997 and 1999 with their 
authors’ patents at the USPTO, ending up with169 PPPs, all of them selected through careful reading of 
both types of documents. 
The number of patents and publications needed for our analysis is so large that we could not rely 
on manual search and reading. So we decided to apply established quantitative methods of data mining 
and information retrieval. We first matched our inventors’ patents to all their scientific articles 
published two years before or two years after the priority date of the patents. The resulting matches 
could be considered a set of potential PPPs for which we then selected the actual PPPs by comparing the 
titles and abstracts of patents and publications through co-word analysis (Bassecoulard and Zitt, 2004; 
Leopold et al., 2004).  
Given t the priority year of a patent and i the individual listed among its designated inventors, a 
potential patent-publication pair is defined as the association between the patent and a publication that 
has individual i among the authors and has been published in the period [t-2, t+2]. After excluding all 
duplications (which may occur when two or more patents or two or more publications have the same co-
                                                 
20 The first formal definition of a patent-publication pair can be found in Murray (2002): “…in periods when scientific and 
technical constructs become intertwined (when scientific ideas represent not only new insights but also new technical solutions), 
the same idea is often inscribed in both a patent and a paper (publication), thus forming a patent–paper pair. These two 
“documents” form a natural experiment because they transcribe the same idea and yet the texts are distinct—a paper describes 
experimental results, while a patent defines utility and makes claims on inventiveness” (p. 1392). 
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inventors or co-authors and title), all publications with no abstracts, and all patents which their 
inventors declared to be unrelated to any publication of theirs, the final sample of potential patent-
publication pairs is composed of 6810 pairs, 218 individuals, 389 patents and 2838 publications.21 
A description of this sample is provided in Tables 1, 2 and 3 and in Figure 1. Table 1 shows the 
number of academic inventors by field and year of birth. Table 2 shows the number of patents by 
priority date and type of applicant (note that 63 per cent of patents are owned by business companies). 
Table 3 shows the number of publications by year of publication and author’s discipline (note that 60 per 
cent of the publications in the sample are from scientists in the fields of Biology and Pharmacology). 
[TABLE 1 here] 
[TABLE 2 here] 
[TABLE 3 here] 
[FIGURE 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows the observed frequencies for the number of authors and inventors in each of the 
2838 publications and 389 patents constituting the potential PPPs. The distribution of the number of 
authors has a fatter tail to the right. The median number of authors per publication is between 4 and 5. 
The median number of inventors per patent is between 2 and 3. Moreover, the maximum number of 
inventors per patent is 21 whereas there are 23 publications with a number of authors greater than 21 
(the top two publications have 337 and 517 authors respectively). 
For all documents in this potential PPP set we examine the title and abstract, and transform 
them into comparable information sets. The first step of the transformation consists of removing the 
uninformative words (so called stop words) from both titles and abstracts: these are very frequent terms 
that are not relevant for the identification of PPPs, such as pronouns, conjunctions, and the most 
frequent nouns and verbs.  
In the second step, we apply a traditional data-mining method, the so-called bag of words 
method, which the literature considers both simple and effective (Salton and McGill, 1983; p.13); 
Leopold et al., 2004). For each disciplinary field we build a complete set of words from all titles and 
abstracts of the patents and publications (with the exclusions of the stop words), so that each document 
j (patent or publication) can be represented by a vector. Each cell (i,j) in the vector has a value equal to 
1 if the word i appears in document j, and 0 otherwise (Bassecoulard and Zitt, 2004). This vector 
                                                 
21Academic inventors’ declarations on the existence (or non-existence) of publications related to their patents were collected by 
means of structured phone interviews. Among other things, interviewees were asked, with reference to each of their patents, 
whether or not they had published the results of the research leading to the patent itself. Responses were obtained from 154 out 
of 308 inventors, for a total of 372 patents out of 552. Overall, interviewees confirmed the existence of a patent-related 
publication for 86 per cent of the patents.  
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representation may be used to produce a large number of “similarity measures” between patents and 
publications. The most common one, which we use here, is the cosine similarity measure (S).  
If xij is the value of the binary variable for document j and word i, S measures the similarity 









Theoretical values of S are in the continuous [0,1] range. In our application, S takes values 
comprised between 0 and 0.75. For our analysis, we select those PPPs whose S value falls in the top 10 
per cent of the distribution, which is comprised between 0.145 and the maximum, for a total of 681 
cases.22  
Different to methodologies employed by other authors, our bibliometric approach does not 
ensure a one-to-one match between patents and publications (one patent corresponding to just one 
publication, and vice versa). This occurrence is limited to 44 cases out of 681 PPPs. Many more cases are 
the result of “one-to-many” matches, that is matches between one patent and several publications (more 
precisely, we have 76 patents matched to 271 publications, which originate as many PPPs); or of “many-
to-many” matches, in which n>1 patents jointly match m>1 publications,  for a total of 346 cases. The 
“many(patents)-to-one(publication)” case is much rarer, with 6 publications associated with 20 patents, 
for a total of 20 PPPs.  
The large number of many-to-many PPPs is not unexpected: a good research project will 
certainly produce more than one result worthy of publication, and possibly more than one patent. As for 
the prevalence of one-to-many over many-to-one cases, one can reasonably presume that scientists 
facing patentable research results will tend to publish them separately (in order to keep the length of 
articles under control, or simply to follow a “salami slicing” strategy), but to patent them jointly. In 
fact, the patent system provides many incentives to pool several claims in a single application: for 
example, the application and renewal fees are set per patent, not per claim; and broader patents are 
more effective in protecting the economic exploitation of the invention. 
                                                 
22 In order to check the robustness of the matching method we also used three other different selection methods to find the 
actual patent-publication pairs. We proceeded as follows: (1) For each potential patent-publication pair, we compared the 
patent and publication abstracts, and calculated the number of words that are the same in the two documents. Then we 
calculated the share of words that are the same in the total number of words in the patent abstract. (2) This method selected the 
patent-publication pairs simply on the basis of the answers to a questionnaire, filed for a subset of 154 academic inventors. In 
particular, we retained as actual patent-publication pairs only those by academic inventors who confirmed that the scientific 
research leading to the patented invention also produced technical or scientific publications. The total number of patent-
publication pairs in this case is 3380. (3) It is equivalent to the bag of words, with the only difference being that cells in the 
vectors do not contain dummies but frequencies, that is, the number of occurrences for each word in the documents. After 
calculating S with this type of vectors, we selected once again the patent-publication pairs in the top 10 percentile (with S 
ranging from 0.206 to 0.81). The descriptive results found were similar in all respects and are available from the authors on 
request. 
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The large number of one-to-many and many-to-many PPPs also has implications for our 
analysis. In particular, it suggests that the appropriate unit of analysis may be the overall team of 
authors (inventors) listed in the set of related publications (patents). This is because, within a research 
team, the distribution of authorship and inventorship over different publications and patents may 
reflect a specific division of labour and/or some team agreements over IPRs. Accordingly, focusing on 
individual patents or publications within a given one-to-many or many-to-many PPP may be 
misleading, since an author who has been excluded from one patent can be included in a related one. 
Therefore we investigated the determinants of authors’ exclusion both from individual patents in a PPP, 
and from each set of related patents. 
 
4. Descriptive analysis 
We present two types of results. In section 4.1, we consider all the selected PPPs and document 
the extent of the author-inventor bias. In section 4.2, we analyse author exclusion; in order to do so, we 
take into account only the publications whose authors are not listed in alphabetical order, and look at 
the position in the by-line of the excluded authors. 
4.1 Number of authors and number of inventors 
Table 4 shows that the average number of inventors per PPPs is 3.6, while the average number 
of authors is significantly higher (equal to 5). Figure 2 reports the frequency distribution of the 
difference between the number of authors and the number of inventors per PPP, both for the initial set 
of potential PPPs and for the PPPs selected through the bag of words method: it shows that the average 
and median differences between authors and inventors are reduced when moving from the first one to 
the latter, in particular, the distribution is more concentred around the mean, which in turn is closer to 
one.  
[TABLE 4 here] 
[FIGURE 2 here] 
These results are indicative of the existence of an exclusion process. We also counted, for all 
many-to-many PPPs, the total number of authors and inventors to see whether an exclusion pattern at 
the group level could be detected, and obtained results which are very close to those of Figure 2 and 
Table 4: this means that even when the same publication is related to more than one patent, it may 
happen that one of the co-authors is excluded from all patents. 
However, significant differences exist across disciplines. We have 178 patent-publication pairs in 
Biology, 201 in Pharmacology, 62 in Chemicals and Material Technology and, finally, 240 in Electronics 
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and Telecommunications. Figure 3 and Table 4 show that the average difference between the number of 
authors and the number of inventors is significantly higher than zero only in Biology and Pharmacology. 
In Chemical Engineering and Material Technology and Electronics & Telecommunications we find that 
the average number of authors and inventors are roughly the same, and the median value of the author-
inventor difference across PPPs is equal to 0.  
4.2 Patterns of Exclusion 
In order to investigate whether a specific pattern of exclusion emerges, we select those PPPs in 
which the authors of the publications are not listed in alphabetical order. We rank the publications by 
number of authors and then single out the position in the by-line of the excluded authors. Results are 
displayed in Table 5. The table shows the number of exclusions by position of the excluded author in the 
by-line and number of authors per publication. For the sake of simplicity, but without loss of relevant 
information, we include only the publications with up to 14 authors.  
Table 5 indicates that the last author listed in the by-line of the paper title, who we may presume 
to be the scientist heading the research team, appears to have the lowest probability of being excluded, 
followed by the first author. Authors in between the first and the last position are excluded relatively 
more often. When considering the four disciplinary fields separately, we do not detect any significant 
difference across fields.23 This stylized evidence shows that the position of an author in the by-line is 
informative on his/her probability of exclusion from the patent, as explained in section 2.  
 
[TABLE 5 here] 
 
5. Estimation of the probability of exclusion 
In this section we estimate the probability of an author’s exclusion from inventorship in a 
patent-publication pair, as a function of both the author’s contribution to the research effort and 
personal (biographical, professional) characteristics. The sample we use for the estimation is built up as 
follows. We start from the 681 PPPs selected using the bag of words method. From these we exclude: (1) 
all publications with only one author; (2) all the publications whose author by-line is in alphabetical 
order and with a number of authors greater or equal to the number of inventors; (3) all the academic 
inventors from the KEINS database, because for these scientists the probability of being excluded is zero 
                                                 
23 Results are not displayed but are available from the authors. 
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by construction; 24  (4) two publications whose number of authors made the data collection effort 
daunting (36 and 42 authors, respectively). This leaves us with 467 patent-publication pairs, 184 
patents, 320 publications and 899 authors. The resulting sample contains 1842 observations, each of 
them representing a scientist.25 The observations are the individual authors for each PPP and therefore 
each scientist may enter the sample more than once if he/she has more than one publication, and/or these 
are related to more than one patent.26  
Having excluded from the database all the academic inventors whose patents originated our 
search, the scientists included are only the co-authors. For all of them, we know the number of their 
yearly publications and the year of their first publication recorded in the ISI Science Citation Index, 
which we assume to mark the start of their academic career. 
Our dependent variable y is the exclusion event, which is yij=1 if the author i of the publication is 
excluded from the inventorship of the related patent j and yij=0 otherwise. The overall percentage of 
exclusions in our sample is 81.92. Pr(yij=1|x) is the probability that author i is excluded from the related 
patent j, conditional on a set of variables x. To estimate the determinants of this probability we take 
into account several variables, some related to the individuals’ characteristics, others to characteristics 
of the PPPs. Table 6 provides summary statistics. Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. 
 
[TABLE 6 here] 
 
For the individuals’ characteristics, we consider: 
- The contribution to the publication, that is, the individual’s position in the author by-line, as 
measured by two dummy variables: LAST and FIRST (middle authors being the reference case). 
Following the discussion in section 2 and the evidence provided in section 4.2, we expect both to 
bear a negative sign. 
- Seniority, measured either in absolute terms or relative to the other authors in the publication. In 
absolute terms, we measure individual i’s SENIORITY at the time of the invention, as the 
difference between the priority year of patent j (tpatj) and the year of his/her first publication (tfpi). 
As for relative seniority, we measure it with a continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 1, defined as: 
                                                 
24 By construction, all the publications in the sample have been authored or co-authored by the academic inventors; therefore, 
we may never observe their exclusion. 
25 There are 12 observations related to 10 publications with only two authors. We kept these observations in the sample. Their 
exclusion does not change the econometric results in any respect. 
26 If scientist i is the author of two publications, both related to the same patent B, he/she will enter our database twice; if 
scientist i is the author of two publications, both of them related to patents A and B, he/she will enter our database 4 times; if 
scientist i is the author of one publication related to just one patent, he/she will enter our database just once; the latter is the 
most common case that covers 32.3 per cent of the number of observations. 
 16 
RELATIVE SENIORITYij=(tfpi -t0j)/(t1j-t0j) 
where tfpi is the year of the first publication of individual i, and t0j and t1j are the years of the first 
publication of, respectively, the most and the least experienced among all the authors of the 
publication.  
Alternatively, we measure relative seniority with two dummy variables, MOST_SENIOR and 
MOST_JUNIOR, the former being equal to one for RELATIVE SENIORITY=1, the latter for 
RELATIVE SENIORITY=0. Following the discussion in section 4.2, we expect SENIORITY, 
RELATIVE_SENIORITY and MOST_SENIOR to bear a negative sign, and MOST_JUNIOR to 
bear a positive one. 
- The professional experience of scientists is also measured in absolute and relative terms. In 
absolute terms, we use the stock of individual i’s publications (STOCK) one year before the patent 
priority date (tpatj-1). In relative terms, we build the continuous variable, ranging from one to zero: 
RELATIVE EXPERIENCEijtpat=(STOCKtpati-STOCKtpat0j)/( STOCKtpat1j - STOCKtpat0j) 
where STOCKtpati is individual i’s stock of publications at the priority date of the patent and 
STOCKtpat1j and STOCKtpat0j are respectively the highest and the lowest stock of publications at 
tpatj among the stocks of all the authors of all the publications related to patent j. Alternatively, we 
employ two dummies for the scientists with the highest and lowest scientific experience, 
respectively (TOP_SCHOLAR, BOTTOM_SCHOLAR). Following the discussion in section 4.2, we 
expect STOCK, RELATIVE_EXPERIENCE and TOP_SCHOLAR to bear a negative sign, and 
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR to bear a positive one. 
As control variables, we consider several characteristics of each PPP:27 
- The number of authors of the publications related to patent j (N_AUTj): the larger the team of 
scientists, the higher the probability that some authors will be excluded, due to dilution of 
contributions, or more disputes over them. 
- The academic inventor’s discipline (ELECTRONICS, PHARMACOLOGY, BIOLOGY and 
CHEMISTRY). We do not know each individual’s disciplinary field, but we assume it is the same 
as that of the academic inventor of whom he/she is co-author. 
- Journal dummies: journals may differ in their tolerance of multiple authorship, with some journals 
adopting stricter authorship criteria than others. In addition, journal dummies may serve as 
                                                 
27 We also control for the ownership of the patent through a series of dummy variables that indicate whether the patent 
application was filed respectively by one or more of the inventors, a business company, or either a university or a public 
research organization (including government agencies; see INDIVIDUAL, PRIVATE, and OPEN SCIENCE in Table 6). These 
variables are never significant in the regressions and, not having strong a priori on the expected sign of the relationship, they 
have been excluded from the analysis. Results are available from the authors. 
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controls for the disciplinary field, so we use them as an alternative to controls for the scientist’s 
discipline 
- The difference between the publication year and the priority year of the patent (DELTA_YEARj = 
tpubj -tpatj), which controls for the accuracy of our matching exercise, and is also sensitive to 
interpretation related to scientists’ patenting strategies (see discussion in section 5.2, below) 
- Time dummies for the priority dates of the patent, which may capture changes in the practice of 
listing inventors in patents or authors in publications over time. 
The correlation matrix in Appendix 3 shows how high the correlation is between seniority and 
experience, and between the absolute and relative measures of the two variables.  We also notice that all 
the listed explanatory variables appear to be correlated, either negatively or positively, with the 
exclusion event. Finally, we note that seniority is correlated with FIRST and LAST, respectively with a 
negative and a positive sign: this provides support for our assumption that first authors are likely to be 
junior team partners, and last authors the most senior ones. 
In what follows, we first examine the relationship between the position of the author in the 
publication by-line and the likelihood of exclusion from the patent. Second, we examine the impact of 
the absolute and relative seniority and scientific status of the authors on the likelihood of exclusion. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results through a number of regressions based upon a more 
restrictive definition of PPPs. 
5.1 Results 
Tables 7 and 8 display the results of our regression analysis. In particular, Table 7 reports the 
results for the Logit regressions and Table 8 for linear probability models. In both exercises we assume 
that observations are independent across individuals, but not necessarily across publications and patents 
by the same individual scientists. As control variables, in column (1) of both Tables 7 and 8 we consider 
the authors’ years of academic activity (SENIORITY), scientific experience (STOCK(t-1)), the number 
of authors in the publication (N_AUT) and the distance in time between the publication and the related 
patent (DELTA_YEARS).  
In columns (2) and (3) we also control for the authors’ seniority and the scientific experience 
relative to their co-authors [MOST_JUNIOR, MOST_SENIOR, TOP_SCHOLAR, 
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR in column (2); RELATIVE_SENIORITY and RELATIVE_EXPERIENCE in 
column (3)]. In columns (4), (5) and (6) we replicate the same regressions of columns (1) to (3), but with 
the addition of dummy variables for the scientific journals.28 
                                                 
28  To avoid the problem of perfect collinearity, we included dummy variables only for those journals with at least 15 
observations in our sample. 
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 [TABLE 7 and 7b here] 
[TABLE 8 here] 
 
Our results show that both first and last authors have a significantly lower probability of being 
excluded from inventorship than middle authors. This result holds across all specifications in Tables 7 
and 8. First authors are less likely to be excluded than last ones. In Table 7b we calculate the changes in 
the predicted probability of exclusion for a discrete change in FIRST and LAST (with all other variables 
held at their mean value), based upon Logit regression (1) in Table 7: we obtain values equal to -0.17 and 
-0.13, respectively, which are not far from the marginal effects derived from the linear probability model.  
Assuming that first authors have contributed the most, and most creatively, to the publication, 
these results suggest that their lower probability of exclusion reflects the rule of law. The same 
explanation is consistent with the assumption that last authors contribute to the research effort more 
and more creatively than middle authors, but less than the first ones, so that their probability of 
exclusion is lower than the former and higher than the latter. 
Table 7 also shows that the probability of exclusion decreases significantly with the scientist’s 
years of activity. In Logit regressions (1) and (3) of Table 7, the estimated coefficient of SENIORITY is 
negative and significantly different from zero; the same applies to RELATIVE_SENIORITY, in 
columns (3)and (6); in all these cases, controls for experience are not significant. However, when we 
measure seniority and experience in relative terms, but with dummy variables, it is experience that turns 
out to be significant, in particular BOTTOM_SCHOLAR. This suggests that, other things being equal, 
the scientist with the lowest publication stock in the team (in many cases, no publications at all) has the 
highest probability of exclusion from inventorship: this may be either a very junior scientist, or a 
laboratory technician. Results from linear probability regressions in Table 8 once again are in line with 
those of Logit regressions, and lend themselves to be interpreted as marginal values. 
Table 9, Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the predicted probabilities of exclusion based upon Logit 
regression (1) in Table 7, for different levels of SENIORITY. The analysis of the marginal effect of 
SENIORITY for individuals who are first in the by-line shows that the first ten years of activity help to 
decrease the probability of exclusion by approximately 0.15. The same analysis for individuals who are 
last in the by-line suggests that the same increase in seniority decreases the probability of exclusion by 
approximately 0.14. The following ten years of activity (that is, from the 10th to the 20th) reduce the 
probability of exclusion of first and last authors respectively by 0.20 and 0.18.  
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[TABLE 9 here] 
[FIGURES 4 and 5 here] 
These results indicate that, given the same contribution to the publication (position in the by-
line), a junior scientist is significantly more at risk of being excluded from the patent than a senior one. 
Figures 4 and 5 and the calculated marginal effects illustrate this point. Among authors who are first in 
the by-line, a 10-year increase in seniority gives a substantial premium in terms of reduced probability of 
exclusion.  
A first implication of our results is that seniority matters so much compared to contribution that 
it is difficult to rule out the possibility of arbitrary exclusion of younger scholars from inventorship (type 
III exclusion). 
 The second implication comes from the evidence that last authors also benefit greatly from 
seniority: a 10-year increase in years of activity provides them with a substantial premium in terms of 
reduced probability of exclusion.  This may be either because senior scientists’ contribution is extremely 
valuable (so that we presume they also contribute to the invention) or because of the social norms 
attached to seniority. However, we control for the scientists’ stock of publications, which captures 
experience.  So we can argue that in our regressions seniority signals leadership, which places the last 
author in a position to decide over his/her own inclusion in the inventor list.  
In section 3, we remarked that one-to-many and many-to-many patent-publication associations 
may originate from broad research projects where the distribution of authorship and inventorship credits 
is negotiated at the team level, having in mind the overall set of project deliverables. In the regression 
sample we have 72 publications of this type. Therefore, we have taken care of building a subsidiary 
database, in which we consider all the patents linked to one publication. In this case the exclusion event 
concerns the whole set of inventors related to all the patents matched with one single publication.  
Table 10 reports the results of a set of Logit regressions identical to those of Table 7, but in which 
Pr(yij=1|x) is the conditional probability that author i is excluded, not just from one patent, but from 
all the patents related to his/her publication (that is, j does not represent one of the patents related to i’s 
publication, but the entire set of patents related to it; the set of explanatory variables x does not 
change). 
 
[TABLE 10 here] 
 
We note immediately that the sign and significance of the estimated parameters for FIRST does 
not change, although their magnitude decreases. Also, the estimated parameter for LAST maintains its 
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sign, and remains significant, albeit only at 95 per cent or 90 per cent confidence levels. All proxies for 
seniority and experience, both absolute and relative, maintain their sign and significance, and increase 
slightly in absolute terms. Only the control variable DELTA_YEARS becomes not significant. We 
conclude that the core of our results remains unchanged when we alter our definition of “exclusion from 
inventorship”. 
Additional controls include category variables for the most important journals, the priority year 
of the patent, and finally, dummy variables indicating whether the ownership of a patent is assigned to 
open science institutions, companies or individuals (as described in footnote 27). For most of these 
controls, coefficients are not statistically different from zero and no regular patterns emerge. 
5.2 Robustness Check 
Robustness of our results depends on the quality of our PPP dataset. A possible cause of concern 
is the potential mix of both false positives (patents and publications we have paired under the same 
PPP, while in reality they are unrelated) and false negatives (patents and publications we failed to 
match, but which are indeed closely related). In particular, to the extent that senior authors and 
laboratory heads sign more papers than junior scientists, we are concerned with the possibility that false 
positives could bias some of our results, particularly the estimated coefficients of last author, seniority 
and scientific experience. 
In order to control for these potential problems, we build a more restrictive PPP sample, by 
selecting only the patent-publication pairs with an S similarity score in the top 5 per cent of the 
distribution. This leaves us with only 341 PPPs, with a minimal value of S equal to 0.174. We then run a 
set of Logit regressions identical to those of Table 7, the results of which are reported in Table 11. Our 
results confirm the negative effect of SENIORITY (or, alternatively, of RELATIVE_SENIORITY) on 
the probability of being excluded from inventorship, with a slight increase in the estimated coefficient. 
However, they do not confirm the role of scientific experience (see the lack of significance for 
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR). In addition, the estimated coefficients FIRST and LAST maintain the sign and 
significance of the original exercise, although with a somewhat larger order of magnitude 
 
[TABLE 11 here] 
 
If we raise the bar further, and select only the PPPs whose similarity scores fall within the top 1 
per cent of the distribution (the minimal level of S reaches 0.25), we again obtain similar results. In this 
case we are left with 68 PPPs and 156 observations in the regression sample. In particular, estimated 
 21 
parameters from the Logit regression for FIRST, LAST and SENIORITY become, respectively, -
2.25***, -2.35*** and -0.19***.29  
In order to perform a further robustness check, we may consider a different way to restrict our 
sample of PPPs. In particular, we may consider only the publications appearing after the priority date 
of the related patents, namely those for which the variable DELTA_YEARS takes a null or positive 
value. The rationale behind this restriction is that research teams, especially if well advised by their 
TTO, are more likely to publish their papers after filing the patent, in order to avoid endangering its 
novelty. So, we could suspect that PPPs where DELTA_YEARS<0 are more likely to be false positive 
than those for which DELTA_YEARS≥0.  
Table 12 replicates the Logit regression of column (1) of Table 7, for two different PPP samples, 
one for observations with DELTA_YEARS≥0, the other one for the complementary set of observations 
(DELTA_YEARS<0). 
 
[TABLES 12 and 12b here] 
 
The results for the former sample are similar, in terms of sign and significance of the estimated 
parameters, to those of Table 7; the main difference being only the magnitude of FIRST and LAST 
parameters, which is respectively lower and higher than expected (the SENIORITY parameters also 
appear smaller). By contrast, the regression for DELTA_YEARS<0 returns a very high coefficient for 
FIRST and a non-significant one for LAST, which is consistent with the possibility that part of our 
results in Table 7 were affected by a bias due to the methodology followed for the creation of our PPP 
sample. Note, however, that the observations with DELTA_YEARS<0 account for just one third of the 
sample, so that we can still declare ourselves confident of the overall robustness of the results.  
One reason not to exclude altogether from our sample the publications with DELTA_YEARS<0 
is that there may be an alternative explanation for the results of Table 12, one that is substantive rather 
than purely statistical. Such an explanation is based on the possibility that, within a team of scientists, 
the decision to file a patent may come along two different routes, which affect differently the 
distribution of inventorship credits. In particular, we suspect that publications with DELTA_YEARS≥0 
may be the result of a deliberate strategy, imposed by the leading authors (FIRST and LAST), which 
aims at avoiding the risk of invalidating the patent by publishing the invention-related research results 
                                                 
29 The complete results are not displayed but are available from the authors. 
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too early.30 In this case we can expect the probability of exclusion to be altogether low, and not much 
different for first and last authors, as indeed suggested by Table 12.  
Conversely, when we observe a scientific article published before the filing of the related patent, 
we may suspect that scientists did not set out looking for a patent, but changed their minds after finding 
promising scientific results. In this case, the patent could be generated by the specific additional activity 
of the author who has contributed most to the research activity, i.e. the first author. This interpretation 
is consistent with the very high absolute value of the negative coefficient for FIRST (as opposed to the 
lack of significance for LAST) for PPPs with DELTA_YEARS<0.  
The “substantive interpretation” of results in Table 12 is in line with some recent results from 
studies on academic inventors’ publishing activity. Breschi et al. (2008) show that those academic 
inventors who have signed just one patent have a peak in their publications one year before the patent, 
which suggests that their patents are a one-off by-product of a successful, non-patent-targeted research 
project. On the contrary, serial academic inventors, who make joint plans for publishing and patenting, 
reach their publication peak at a later date, from one to three years after the first patent. Consistently, 
Azoulay et al. (2007) show that most patenting events are preceded by a flurry of publications.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated the relative weight of social norms and legal rules on the 
determinants of authorship and inventorship attribution in patent-publication pairs. First, our analysis 
confirms that in patent-publication pairs the number of authors is usually larger than the number of 
inventors, and that this is due to the exclusion of several authors of a publication, or set of related 
publications, from the related patent or set of patents. We find also that the difference between the 
number of authors and inventors is significantly positive only in Biology and Pharmacology. 
Second, we contribute to the emerging technical literature on PPPs by proving the usefulness of 
text-mining techniques for matching patents and publications. Our application of such techniques 
suggests a more complex picture of the patent-publication relationship than envisaged so far. We find 
that complex combinations of patents and publications are likely: not only one-to-one correspondences 
between individual patents and publications, but also (and mainly) several publications connected to a 
single patent or several publications associated with several patents. 
                                                 
30 This is particularly true in Italy (to which our data refer) and more generally in Europe, where the “grace period” rule does 
not apply. On the contrary, in countries where the rule applies, such as the USA, patent offices allow inventors to submit an 
invention-related article to a scientific journal before filing the patent, as long as they take care to file the patent within six 
months after the publication of their article 
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Third, we provide evidence on three possible causes of exclusion from inventorship. Authors of a 
publication may be excluded either because their authorship contribution was substantial, but 
insufficient to qualify as inventorship, in accordance with legal criteria; or because their authorship 
contribution was by itself negligible, as in the case of “gift” and “guest” authorship; or, finally, because 
of mere seniority considerations, which put junior scientists more at risk of being denied inventorship, 
compared to senior colleagues, other things being equal.  
Our results are of both practical and theoretical interest. On the practical side, we observe that 
inventorship attribution cannot be entirely explained by a scientist’s contribution to a research project, 
as it should be according to the rule of law. Social norms are important, so that seniority matters 
considerably. To some extent, this may be simply the result of the difficulties any team of scientists 
meets when it comes to quantifying individual contributions to a project: borderline cases may be solved 
with a favourable decision for senior scientists, and a less favourable one for junior associates. However, 
on the basis of our results we cannot exclude that senior scientists with insufficient contribution are 
granted inventorship, and junior scientists with sufficient contribution are not. If this is the case, the 
application of social norms leaves room for litigation and generates serious concern for the university and 
its technology transfer offices, and all the policy makers who in recent times have greatly encouraged 
academic patenting. This finding reinforces mounting doubts on the efficiency of reputational systems in 
science, especially in medical-related fields. It sends a word of caution to all policy makers who are 
currently pushing to link the distribution of research funds to automated or quasi-automated 
bibliometric assessments of scientific productivity: such exercises rely too heavily on the questionable 
concept of authorship to be accepted as sensible solutions to the complexity of the economics of science.  
On the theoretical side, our results contribute to the criticism of the economic and social value of 
the concept of scientific authorship, and extend such criticism to that of “inventorship”. With the 
transformation of science into a collective enterprise, no immediate correspondence exists anymore 
between papers and authors, so that the concept of authorship becomes increasingly problematic. Our 
results are in line with the idea that authorship is the result of a complex web of social and legal 
conventions. While academic science still cherishes the idea that the scientific discovery is the result of 
an individual’s spark of genius, other fields of human creativity have abandoned it (Fisk, 2006). In 
movie-making, for example, it is taken for granted that a division of labour exists between the various 
professional figures, so that specialized credits are awarded to each of them (directors, screenwriters, 
choreographers, sound-makers….); this does not prevent the existence of some prestige ranking (think of 
directors and stars, as opposed to more technical figures), but it allows due credit to be distributed to all 
participants in the creative act. Some steps in the same direction have been undertaken by several 
scientific journals, especially in medical sciences (JAMA, Lancet, British Medical Journal, Radiology and 
the Journal of Public Health among others), which now require scientists not merely to identify 
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themselves as “authors”, but also to specify the exact contents of their contribution according to pre-
determined categories, as recommended by the ‘Authorship Task Force’ set up by the Council of Science 
Editors in 1998  (Rennie, 1998; Biagioli et al., 1999; Hwang, 2003). A key argument put forward by the 
task force was precisely that in modern science the concept of ‘authorship’ is irreparably obsolete, and 
that ‘contributorship’ should replace it.  
Patent laws may incur the same type of problems, and consider the same solutions, when it 
comes to dealing with inventorship. The legal figure of the inventor is also an obsolete one that dates 
back to a time – the XIX century – when the existence of patents had been put into question, and was 
defended by the creation of a public image of inventors as “heroes of the industrial revolution”, that is 
individuals whose rights ought to be defended (Machlup and Penrose, 1950; Long, 1991; Bracha, 2005; 
MacLeod, 2008). To the extent that the division and specialization of the “inventive labour” is 
increasing (very much like the division and specialization of the “scientific labour” has been increasing 
over half a century), a greater articulation of the different tasks in the inventive activity is needed to 
avoid room for abuses and litigation. In that respect, our work can be considered not only as an 
exploration in the field of attribution rights in academic science and technology, but also as a first step 
in the direction of investigating the overall adequacy of present norms of inventorship attribution.  
We think that further research is needed in order to make use of biographical and career data, 
and not just bibliometric information, to confirm the validity of our inferences on the role of social 
norms in defining authorship and inventorship, and to investigate the adequacy of those norms for 
organizational changes in research activities. Moreover, the analysis of inventorship attribution could be 
extended to corporate patents, and to the impact that mis-attribution may have on the labour market 
for industrial researchers. It would also be of great interest to explore differences in scientific authorship 
attribution across academic institutions and countries, as a result of differences in the institutional 
profile of academic systems, funding, and labour markets. 
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Table 1 Number of academic inventors by field and years of birth 
 Years    
Fields 1925-1939 1940-1954 1955-1969 Total 
Pharmacology  15 24 21 60 
Biology  12 30 17 59 
Chemical Engineering. & 
Materials Technology 10 21 14 45 
Electronics and Telecom  
Engineering 4 24 26 54 





Table 2. Number of patents by priority date and type of assignee 
 TYPE         
Years INDIVIDUAL OPEN PRIVATE n.a. Total 
1988-1991 37 29 115 22 203 
1992-1994 3 33 108 25 169 
1995-1997 12 41 144 22 219 
1998-2000 5 10 62 9 86 
Total 57 113 429 78 677 





Table 3. Number of publications by year of publication and fields 
 Fields         
Years Pharmacology  Biology  
Chemical Eng. 
& Materials  
Electronics & 
Telecom  Eng. Total 
1990-1993 195 263 121 144 723 
1994-1996 282 407 169 278 1136 
1997-1999 229 340 87 301 957 
2000-2002 43 37 16 92 188 
Total 749 1047 393 815 3004 
The total number of publications considered is 2838. Double counting occurs for publications co-authored by two or 
more scientists from different disciplines. 
Table 4: Summary statistics on potential and selected patent-publication pairs, total samples and by scientists’ field. 
 
































8.51 1 517 3.62 1 21 4.89 -18 515 1 
Selected PPPs 
(Bag of words) 
5.00 1 42 3.36 1 21 1.64 -18 37 1 
?of which:           
Pharmacology 6.47 2 14 3.75 1 10 2.71 -5 12 2 
Biology 6.32 2 42 3.60 1 21 2.72 -18 37 3 
Chemical Eng. & 
Materials Tech. 
4.54 1 8 4.67 2 11 -0.13 -4 5 0 
Electronics and 
Telecom 





Table 5 Count of exclusions from inventorship, by position of the author in the by-line 
and no. of authors per publication (publications with up to 14 co-authors) 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 None* 
2 19 9 6             3 
3 97 47 63 35            6 
4 98 52 57 68 39           6 
5 69 40 49 50 44 29           
6 58 29 37 40 44 37 26         3 
7 51 25 37 27 38 36 36 26        1 
8 19 13 12 13 15 14 12 9 9        
9 26 12 21 19 18 20 20 20 17 8       
10 8 4 4 6 6 6 5 6 5 3 4      
11 13 10 9 12 11 12 12 12 13 11 11 5     
12 14 7 9 6 10 11 13 13 12 11 10 11 11    
13 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0   
14 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
* No co-author excluded 
 
 
Table 6 Summary statistics for the regression sample. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Y 1842 0.82 0.385 0 1 
First 1842 0.17 0.372 0 1 
Last 1842 0.13 0.340 0 1 
Seniority 1842 7.59 7.67 -2 26 
Stockt_1 1842 18.40 35.08 0 299 
N_aut 1842 7.25 3.33 2 19 
Delta_years 1842 0.48 1.29 -2 2 
Most_junior 1842 0.36 0.478 0 1 
Most_senior 1842 0.14 0.357 0 1 
Top_scholar 1842 0.09 0.289 0 1 
Bottom_scholar 1842 0.33 0.469 0 1 
Relative seniority 1842 0.38 0.384 0 1 
Relative 
experience  
1842 0.23 0.318 0 1 
Chemistry 1842 0.04 0.189 0 1 
Electronics 1842 0.234 0.423 0 1 
Pharma 1842 0.18 0.386 0 1 
Biology 1842 0.55 0.498 0 1 
Open 1842 0.22 0.413 0 1 
Private 1842 0.68 0.467 0 1 





Table 7. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit regressions. 
Dep. Var. =yij       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FIRST -1.11*** -1.02*** -1.10*** -1.07*** -1.01*** -1.08*** 
 (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) 
LAST -0.81*** -0.83*** -0.80*** -0.82*** -0.83*** -0.80*** 
 (0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
N_AUT 0.055* 0.071** 0.062** 0.06 0.072* 0.065* 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.04) (0.037) (0.039) 
DELTA_YEARS -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.24*** 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.06) (0.062) (0.060) 
SENIORITY -0.08***   -0.08***   
 (0.018)   (0.02)   
STOCK(t_1) 0.0041   0.004   
 (0.0032)   (0.003)   
MOST_JUNIOR  0.59*   0.45  
  (0.31)   (0.29)  
MOST_SENIOR  -0.20   -0.27  
  (0.36)   (0.31)  
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.29   0.27  
  (0.34)   (0.33)  
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  0.97***   0.90***  
  (0.33)   (0.31)  
RELATIVE SENIORITY   -1.53***   -1.39*** 
   (0.39)   (0.38) 
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE   0.40   0.29 
   (0.40)   (0.42) 
Constant -0.38 -0.94 0.48 1.54 0.63 1.68*** 
 (1.74) (2.02) (1.89) (0.59) (0.60) (0.61) 
Observations 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 
Time dummies Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Fields dummies Y  Y  Y  N  N  N  
Journal dummies N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 




Table 7b. Change in predicted probabilities of exclusion from inventorship, for 
changes in the author’s position in the by-line, as from regression (1)  
 Excluded Non Excluded 
First 0.71 0.29 
Not first 0.88 0.12 
Difference -0.17  
Last 0.75 0.25 
Not Last 0.87 0.13 
Difference -0.13  
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Table 8. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Linear Probability regressions 
Dep. Var. =yij       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FIRST -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.051) (0.055) (0.05) (0.051) (0.053) 
LAST -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.044) (0.042) (0.04) (0.042) (0.041) 
N_AUT 0.0065* -0.025*** -0.020*** 0.0084* 0.0073* 0.0075* 
 (0.004) (0.0070) (0.0067) (0.004) (0.0041) (0.0042) 
DELTA_YEARS -0.025*** 0.0078** 0.0076** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.007) (0.0080) (0.0076) 
SENIORITY -0.011***   -0.011***   
 (0.003)   (0.003)   
STOCK(t_1) 0.00064   0.00083*   
 (0.0004)   (0.0004)   
MOST_JUNIOR  0.060*   0.043  
  (0.035)   (0.035)  
MOST_SENIOR  -0.034   -0.041  
  (0.055)   (0.050)  
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.039   0.036  
  (0.053)   (0.054)  
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  0.11***   0.10***  
  (0.037)   (0.035)  
RELATIVE SENIORITY   -0.20***   -0.18*** 
   (0.061)   (0.061) 
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE   0.049   0.038 
   (0.067)   (0.070) 
CONSTANT 0.55* 0.40 0.56* 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.75*** 
 (0.3) (0.34) (0.32) (0.1) (0.11) (0.12) 
Observations 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fields dummies Y Y Y N N N 
Journal dummies N N N Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 9. Change in predicted probability of exclusion from inventorship, for changes in author’s position 
in the by-line and different levels of SENIORITY, as from regression (1) in Table 7 
 Last author First author  
Seniority Non Excluded Excluded Non Excluded Excluded 
0 0.15 0.85 0.18 0.82 
5 0.21 0.79 0.25 0.75 
10 0.29 0.71 0.33 0.67 
15 0.37 0.62 0.43 0.57 
20 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.47 
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Table 10. Probability of exclusion from inventorship (entire set of publication-related patents): Logit 
regressions. 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FIRST -0.77** -0.69** -0.76** -0.74** -0.68** -0.74** 
 (0.3) (0.30) (0.30) (0.3) (0.31) (0.32) 
LAST -0.51* -0.56* -0.50* -0.53* -0.58** -0.52* 
 (0.3) (0.29) (0.26) (0.3) (0.29) (0.27) 
N_AUT 0.081** 0.10** 0.087** 0.12** 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.042) (0.040) (0.05) (0.048) (0.047) 
DELTA_YEARS -0.062 -0.074 -0.020 -0.094 -0.11 -0.052 
 (0.06) (0.064) (0.063) (0.08) (0.081) (0.079) 
SENIORITY -0.096***   -0.096***   
 (0.02)   (0.02)   
STOCK(t_1) 0.0050   0.0044   
 (0.004)   (0.004)   
MOST_JUNIOR  0.48   0.44  
  (0.35)   (0.34)  
MOST_SENIOR  -0.31   -0.32  
  (0.52)   (0.46)  
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.46   0.33  
  (0.47)   (0.44)  
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  1.21***   1.12***  
  (0.28)   (0.26)  
RELATIVE SENIORITY   -1.73***   -1.69*** 
   (0.56)   (0.53) 
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE   0.47   0.35 
   (0.57)   (0.55) 
Constant 0.71 -0.78 0.78 1.21* 0.13 1.33* 
 (1.6) (1.90) (1.72) (0.7) (0.68) (0.73) 
Observations 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 1842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fields dummies Y Y Y N N N 
Journal dummies N N N Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11. Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit regressions. (restricted PPP sample: top 5% of 
S score) 
Dep. Var. =yij       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FIRST -0.96*** -0.87*** -0.97*** -0.93*** -0.86*** -0.96*** 
 (0.4) (0.34) (0.36) (0.4) (0.33) (0.35) 
LAST -0.95*** -0.98*** -0.98*** -0.96*** -1.02*** -0.98*** 
 (0.3) (0.31) (0.29) (0.3) (0.29) (0.28) 
N_AUT 0.015 0.045 0.032 0.083* 0.11** 0.098** 
 (0.05) (0.050) (0.053) (0.05) (0.042) (0.045) 
DELTA_YEARS -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.078) (0.077) (0.08) (0.083) (0.080) 
SENIORITY -0.094***   -0.092***   
 (0.02)   (0.02)   
STOCK(t_1) 0.0086**   0.010**   
 (0.004)   (0.004)   
MOST_JUNIOR  0.99*   0.86*  
  (0.52)   (0.48)  
MOST_SENIOR  -0.20   -0.20  
  (0.38)   (0.36)  
TOP_SCHOLAR  0.25   0.44  
  (0.41)   (0.40)  
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR  0.35   0.34  
  (0.49)   (0.46)  
RELATIVE SENIORITY   -2.05***   -1.97*** 
   (0.41)   (0.45) 
RELATIVE EXPERIENCE   1.18**   1.16** 
   (0.50)   (0.54) 
CONSTANT 0.80 1.70* 0.67 1.20 0.19 1.25 
 (1.1) (0.99) (1.08) (0.8) (0.80) (0.86) 
Observations 878 878 878 878 878 878 
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fields dummies Y Y Y N N N 
Journal dummies N N N Y Y Y 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Table 12.  Probability of exclusion from inventorship: Logit 
regressions, by values of DELTA_YEARS 
Dep. Var. =yij   
 DELTA_YEARS>0 DELTA_YEARS<0: 
FIRST -0.80*** -2.51*** 
 (0.3) (0.5) 
LAST -0.96*** -0.22 
 (0.2) (0.6) 
SENIORITY -0.069*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
STOCK(t_1) 0.0050 0.00038 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
N_AUT 0.063** 0.082 
 (0.03) (0.1) 
DELTA_YEARS 0.10 -0.41 
 (0.09) (0.3) 
Constant -0.70 4.10 
 (1.6) (2.8) 
Observations 1358 484 
Pseudo R-squared 0.30 0.16 
Time dummies Y  Y  
Fields dummies Y  Y  
Journal dummies N  N  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered for individuals) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 12b. Change in predicted probabilities of exclusion from inventorship, for changes 
in the author’s position in the by-line, by values of DELTA_YEARS 
 Excluded Non Excluded 
With DELTA_YEARS≥0   
First 0.72 0.28 
Not first 0.84 0.15 
Difference -0.12  
With DELTA_YEARS<0   
First 0.73 0.27 
Not first 0.97 0.03 
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Note: This figure refers to the total sample of 2838 publications and 389 patents. The maximum number of co-inventors is 21. There 
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Note: Initial sample refers to the complete set of 6810 potential patent-publication pairs 
 
Figure 3. Observed frequency of author-inventor number gap, by scientific field.  
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Appendix 1 – Methodology for the collection of publication data 
The collection of publication data followed two steps, both of which applied to the ISI Web of Science 
database (ISI-WoS). 
In the first step, data were collected on the publications of the selected academic inventors, with the 
ultimate purpose of identifying the patent-publication pairs (PPPs) necessary to our analysis. In this 
step, the collection effort was limited to the journal articles published in the period from two years 
before to two years after the filing date of the relevant patents, authored or co-authored by scientists 
whose names and surnames coincided with those of the academic inventors in which we were interested. 
No restrictions were applied in terms of the journal’s field, but journals whose title was clearly linked to 
disciplines different from that of the academic inventor were manually deleted.  
In the second step, data were collected for the publications of scientists listed as co-authors of the 
academic inventors’ publications included in selected PPPs (academic inventors were not included in the 
regressions, their probability of exclusion being zero, by definition). Due to the high number of 
scientists, serious problems of homonymy arose which we attempted to reduce by selecting, for each co-
author, only the publications which fell in similar fields to those of the related academic inventors. [Note 
that we could not select only the co-authors’ publication from the same fields as the academic inventors, 
given the possibility that the former and the latter are from different subdisciplines, with a different set 
of reference journals] 
In order to do so, we applied a procedure originally proposed by Engelsman and Van Raan (1992) (see 
also Breschi et al., 2003). In particular, we applied such a procedure to the ISI-WoS classification of the 
journals wherein the academic inventors’ articles were published, for a total of 99 subfields. 31  
Let I be the set of academic inventors. Let Fik = 1 if professor i signed at least one article in a journal 
whose subfield is k (k = 1, ...99), and Fik = 0 otherwise. The number of professors who published at least 
one article in subfield k can be defined as Nk = ∑i Fik. We can thus calculate the number of professors 
who have articles in both scientific subfields w and z as:  
Cwz = ∑i Fiw Fiz.  
Counting joint occurrences of all possible pairs of subfields produces a square (99 x 99) symmetrical 
matrix of co-occurrence, whose generic cell contains Cwz as defined above. In turn, this matrix provides 
the input for the production of a symmetrical “similarity matrix” of the same size, whose generic cell 
contains Swz, a similarity score between subfields w and z, based upon the cosine index measure we 
                                                 
31  The ISI-WoS fields are: Biology, Biomedical Research, Chemistry, Clinical Medicine, Earth & Space, Engineering & 
Technology, Health Sciences, Mathematics, Physics, Professional Fields, Psychology and Social Sciences. Every field is then 
disaggregated into subfields, for a total of 99. 
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already employed to measure the similarity between patents and publications in a given PPP (section 














Swz ranges between 0 and 1 and is not sensitive to the absolute size of the scientific subfields. It is equal 
to one when the two subfields w and z identically co-occur with all other scientific subfields, while it is 
equal to zero for pairs of subfields that do not coincide. 
We then used the similarity matrix as an input to a multidimensional scaling algorithm, which arranges 
the various fields on a 2-D plane by reducing the dimensionality of the data (Klavans and Boyack, 
2006). The mapping of the subfields over the first two dimensions suggested the existence of four meta-
fields: Biomedicine, Pharmaceuticals, Materials Chemistry and Engineering. 
Once we reduced the 99 subfields to these 4 meta-fields, we reclassified the ISI-WoS journals 
accordingly. Finally, we compared the fields of the “reference” articles (the articles of the academic 
inventors) with those of the article signed by the co-authors and retained only those articles for which 
the fields corresponded.  
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Total synthesis and functional overexpression of a 
$i(Candida rugosa) lip1 gene coding for a major 
industrial lipase 
Design, total synthesis, and functional overexpression of 
the Candida rugosa lip1 gene coding for a major industrial 
lipase 
5 inventors 5 authors 
Abstract Abstract 
The dimorphic yeast Candida rugosa has an unusual 
codon usage which hampers the functional 
expression of genes derived from this yeast in a 
conventional heterologous host. Lipases produced 
by this yeast are extensively used in industrial 
bioconversions, but commercial lipase samples 
contain several different isoforms encoded by the lip 
gene family. In a first laborious attempt the lip1 
gene, encoding the major isoform of the C. rugosa 
lipases (crls), was systematically modified by site-
directed mutagenesis to gain functional expression 
in S. cerevisiae. As an alternative approach, the 
gene (1688 bp) was completely synthesised with an 
optimised nucleotide sequence in terms of 
heterologous expression in yeast and simplified 
genetic manipulation. The synthetic gene was 
functionally overexpressed in Pichia pastoris. The 
recombinant crl was produced at high level and 
purity, accounting for 90-95 per cent of the secreted 
proteins. The physical-chemical and catalytic 
properties of the recombinant lipase were compared 
with those of a commercial, non-recombinant C. 
rugosa lipase preparation. 
The dimorphic yeast Candida rugosa has an unusual codon 
usage that hampers the functional expression of genes 
derived from this yeast in a conventional heterologous host. 
Commercial samples of C. rugosa lipase (crl) are widely used 
in industry, but contain several different isoforms encoded 
by the lip gene family, among which the isoform encoded 
by the gene lip1 is the most prominent. In a first laborious 
attempt, the lip1 gene was systematically modified by site-
directed mutagenesis to gain functional expression in 
Saccharomyces cerevisiae. As an alternative approach, the 
gene (1647 bp) was completely synthesized with an 
optimized nucleotide sequence in terms of heterologous 
expression in yeast and simplified genetic manipulation. 
The synthetic gene was functionally expressed using both 
S. cerevisiae and Pichia pastoris as hosts, and the effect of 
heterologous leader sequences on expression and secretion 
was investigated. In particular, using P. pastoris cells, the 
synthetic gene was functionally overexpressed, allowing 
recombinant lip1 of high purity to be produced for the first 
time at a level of 150 U/mL culture medium. The 
physicochemical and catalytic properties of the 
recombinant lipase were compared with those of a 
commercial, non-recombinant C. rugosa lipase preparation 
containing lipase isoforms. 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Correlation matrix for variables in regression exercise (std. errors in brackets) 
 EXCLUSION N_AUT 
DELTA_ 
YEARS 









EXCLUSION 1           
            
N_AUT 0.1036* 1          
 (0.0000)           
DELTA_YEARS -0.0844* 0.1463* 1         
 (0.0003) (0.0000)          
FIRST -0.1323* -0.2113* 0.0009 1        
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.9697)         
LAST -0.1183* -0.1541* -0.0310 -0.1749* 1       
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1840) (0.0000)        
SENIORITY -0.1674* -0.0316 -0.0969* -0.0632* 0.1867* 1      
 (0.0000) (0.1750) (0.0000) (0.0066) (0.0000)       
STOCK(t_1) -0.0613* -0.0341 -0.0332 -0.0612* 0.2099* 0.6064* 1     
 (0.0085) (0.1434) (0.1544) (0.0086) (0.0000) (0.0000)      
MOST_JUNIOR 0.1752* -0.0617* -0.0307 0.0200 -0.0958* -0.6926* -0.3655* 1    
 (0.0000) (0.0081) (0.1875) (0.3912) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)     
MOST_SENIOR -0.0877* -0.0820* 0.0092 -0.0909* 0.1874* 0.5698* 0.3218* -0.2970* 1   
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.6917) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)    
TOP_SCHOLAR -0.0463* -0.0840* 0.0131 -0.0675* 0.1855* 0.4031* 0.6326* -0.2306* 0.4463* 1  
 (0.0468) (0.0003) (0.5733) (0.0038) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)   
BOTTOM_SCHOLAR 0.1783* -0.0074 0.0872* 0.0062 -0.0925* -0.6372* -0.3446* 0.8041* -0.2603* -0.2151* 1 
 (0.0000) (0.7520) (0.0002) (0.7910) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Obs. 1842 
* p<0.01 
 
